Hvorfor Grønland ikke allerede er amerikansk (og nok heller ikke bliver det)

I Danmark er det et udbredt synspunkt, at de årlige bloktilskud til Grønland giver os nogle hvis ikke formelle, så moralske rettigheder i spillet om fremtidige rettigheder til verdens største ø. Men gjort sådan op, har amerikanerne endnu større rettigheder, fordi de varetager territoalforsvaret, der er ekstremt dyrt. Så hvorfor er Grønland ikke allerede amerikansk? Svaret ligger i Trumps sammenligning med en ejendomshandel. Amerikanerne kan umuligt regne et afkast hjem på sådan en handel. Læs her historien om Danmarks og USA’s dans om rettigheder og pligter i forhold til Grønland.

(tranlation into english below)

I sommeren 1941 så de gode borgere i Nuuk for første gang en bil. Det var en jeep tilhørende det amerikanske militær. Den navnkundige grønlandske historiker Jørgen Fleischer skrev om det i bogen ”Forvandlingens år – Grønland fra koloni til landsdel” fra 1996:

”Da køretøjet rullede fra landgangsfartøjet op over stranden, var reaktionerne vidt forskellige. De gamle stirrede mistroisk på tingesten og rystede på hovedet. Småbørn løb grædende og skrækslagne væk fra havneområdet, og de ellers frække knægte var lammede og turde ikke nærme sig uhyret.”

Grønlænderne havde flere af den slags oplevelser, mens Danmark var besat, og forsyningerne i stedet kom fra Amerika. For eksempel så de for første gang en petroleumslampe, og det var en åbenbaring. Pludselig kunne de faktisk se noget i de mørkeste vintermåneder. De tranlamper, de hidtil havde brugt, gav kun et meget svagt lys.

Danmark selv var naturligvis for længst gået bort fra tranlamper. Men det var dansk politik, at grønlænderne ikke skulle belemres med mere moderne civilisation end højest nødvendigt.

Det var en politik, som man, alt efter temperament, kan beskrive som nedladende eller som respektfuld over for en sårbar, oprindelig kultur. Under alle omstændigheder havde amerikanerne ikke den slags fine fornemmelser.

De anlagde hurtigt otte små og store landingsbaner op og ned langs Grønlands vestkyst, som trædesten for den militære flytrafik mellem Amerika og Europa, og når de nu alligevel var i nabolaget, tog de sig også af forsyningen af de grønlandske byer og bygder. Det var en del af den aftale, de indgik med Danmarks ambassadør i Washington, Henrik Kaufmann.

Krigen betød, at grønlænderne vågnede op af en århundredelang tornerosesøvn.

Som Jørgen Fleischer skriver: Krigen betød, at grønlænderne vågnede op af en århundredelang tornerosesøvn. De indså, at den store verden var meget mere end blot de danskere, de kendte. Og da krigen var slut, ville de ikke have den gamle ordning tilbage. De ville have del i den moderne verdens goder.

Et stykke hen ad vejen havde de det naturligvis allerede.

Erik den Røde havde sammen med 500 fæller bosat sig i Sydgrønland i 985. Hans efterkommere mistede efter nogen tid kontakten med hjemlandet – Island, og i en videre forstand det danske kongerige.

Derfor vidste man det heller ikke i København, da nordboerne i Grønland uddøde under omstændigheder, som endnu ikke er klarlagte. Og for 300 år siden gjorde den norske præst Hans Egede det til sin livsopgave at finde nordboerne. Han fik, med kongens velsignelse og penge fra handelsfolk i Bergen, samlet en lille ekspeditionsflåde på tre skibe, der blev sendt afsted i 1721.

De fandt naturligvis ikke nordboerne, men de fandt inuitter, og dem satte Hans Egede sig for at kristne, mens han ledte videre efter nordboerne. Hans Egede oprettede en koloni, som han kaldte Godthåb – i dag Nuuk.

Senere blev der oprettet en lille snes andre kolonier op og ned ad kysten. Nogle i tilknytning til eksisterende inuit-samfund, andre bare på nøgne klipper.

Kernen i disse kolonier var hvalfangst og handel. Danskerne skulle bruge steder til at servicere hvalfangerne og de hvaler, de bragte ind. Og når man var der, handlede man også med de lokale inuitter. Inuitterne solgte for eksempel skind og kunne så få kaffe, sukker og redskaber retur.

De simple varer fra den tids Kongelige Grønlandsk Handel var et stort materielt fremskridt og satte sig varige spor i grønlandsk kultur. Glade hverdagsbegivenheder bliver fejret med kaffemik, og til mere højtidelige lejligheder bærer man nationaldragter, hvoraf kvindernes oprindeligt er designet med de perler, de kunne få i handlen.

Ordet koloni betød i samtiden noget helt andet, end når europæiske lande bemægtigede sig lande i Asien, Afrika eller Amerika.

Men det er altså en anakronisme, når også ledende, danske politikere i dag omtaler Grønland som en tidligere dansk koloni. Ordet koloni betød i samtiden noget helt andet, end når europæiske lande bemægtigede sig lande i Asien, Afrika eller Amerika. I grønlandsk kontekst betød koloni blot en lille bosættelse.

Heller ikke de lokale inuitter så kolonierne som udtryk for erobring af deres territorium. Som de oplevede verden, var de født ind i et endeløst, tyndt befolket land. De flyttede sig alt efter, hvor fangstmulighederne var, og konceptet med grænser mellem jeres land og vores land var ikke faldet dem ind. De opfattede heller ikke, at de var en del af et grønlandsk folk.

Således havde de ikke noget imod, at der kom nogle hvide mennesker og bosatte sig på små pletter af land. Tværtimod, for så vidt det gav dem muligheder for at veksle fangst til goderne fra en fremmed verden.

Danskerne, som kom, var naturligvis kendte med grænser og folk som koncepter. Men endnu da anden verdenskrig brød ud, var det endnu også nyt for dem at se Grønland som et samlet hele. Danmarks administration af landet var delt op i en nordlig og en sydlig del, og i 1930’erne havde Norge hævdet overhøjhed over dele af Østgrønland.

Alt dette blev der rusket op i med verdenskrigen og de midlertidigt afbrudte forbindelser mellem Danmark og Grønland. Umiddelbart efter krigen så grønlænderne måske stadig ikke sig selv som ét folk. Men de havde i det mindste nogle fælles vilkår og interesser at samle sig om: De ønskede fremskridt i forhold til, hvad de havde oplevet under den danske administration af Grønland.

Set fra dansk side var det hele mere speget:

Skulle Grønland i nogen forstand forblive dansk, var man nødt til at tilbyde grønlænderne nogle vilkår, der kunne matche det, som amerikanernes tilstedeværelse gav dem.

Danmark kunne ikke komme uden om det faktum, at grønlænderne så den amerikanske tilstedeværelse som et stort plus. Ikke nok så mange afgørelser til Danmarks fordel ved den internationale domstol i Haag kunne ændre på, at skulle Grønland i nogen forstand forblive dansk, var man nødt til at tilbyde grønlænderne nogle vilkår, der kunne matche det, som amerikanernes tilstedeværelse gav dem.

Det valgte man ret hurtigt at gøre. Med grundlovsændringen i 1953 blev Grønland et amt i Danmark, med alt hvad det indebar – herunder at grønlænderne skulle have samme adgang til offentlige goder som alle andre borgere i Danmark.

Det var en dyr historie for Danmark, og når den løsning blev valgt, kan man kun se det som udslag af, at det for enhver stat er ekstremt svært at frasige sig territorium. Det rationelle valg dengang havde været at overdrage Grønland til amerikanerne. De følelsesmæssige bånd på individplan mellem Grønland og Danmark opstod også først efterfølgende. Dengang var det endnu få danskerne, der havde været på Grønland, eller omvendt.

Realiteten var også, at Grønland militært var under amerikansk overhøjhed. Kaufmann havde skrevet under på, at USA havde omfattende militære rettigheder på øen ud i al fremtid. Det vakte stor polemik i samtiden, men intet kunne ændre på, at det havde vist sig, at det i globale konflikter var af stor betydning at have kontrol over hele Grønland. Den tid, hvor det var nok at patruljere farvandet for konkurrerende hvalfangere, var for længst forbi.

Det stod da også snart klart, at verdenskrigens afslutning ikke betød, at Grønland blev mindre vigtigt. Tværtimod fik amerikanerne brug for det, som skulle blive til Thule Air Base, som en fremskudt post mod Sovjetunionen. Fra midten af 1950’erne tillod danske regeringer i praksis også amerikanerne at have atomvåben på basen, om end dette blev holdt hemmeligt.

I midten af 1990’erne, da den kolde krigs hårde vilkår var kommet så meget på afstand, at det ikke lød alt for dumt at være bagklog om, hvad der var sket, kom der medieopmærksomhed på dette dobbeltspil fra det officielle Danmarks side. Weekendavisen kunne berette, hvad amerikanerne havde taget med til forhandlingsbordet: De ville gerne være venlige over for Danmark, men basen ville blive anlagt uanset hvad, og gjorde Danmark vrøvl, kunne amerikanerne finde to ting fra sin historie af bedømme det ud fra: Det ene var, at de ikke var store fans af europæiske monarkier, det andet var Monroe-doktrinen, som omtalte det amerikanske kontinent (som inkluderer Grønland) som USA’s interessesfære.

Danmark havde ikke begået noget af det, som Monroe-doktrinen betegnede som uvenlige handlinger mod USA.

Ingen af disse historiske argumenter var gode. Danmark var efter anden verdenskrig kun et konstitutionelt monarki, og Danmark havde ikke begået noget af det, som Monroe-doktrinen betegnede som uvenlige handlinger mod USA – nemlig at besætte land, hvor der i forvejen var en etableret statsmagt. Amerikanerne kunne naturligvis ingen indvendinger have mod at etablere stater og regeringer, hvor der endnu ikke fandtes nogen, for det var sådan USA selv voksede sig stort, med udgangspunktet i de 13 kolonier på Østkysten.

Således var der ingen, der havde lyst til at være alt for klare i spyttet om, hvordan Grønlands plads i verdenssamfundet reelt var. Landet blev en del af Danmark, som tog sig af alt det praktiske og administrative. Men det var samtidig soleklart, at USA i praksis havde ret og pligt til at varetage det dyre forsvar af verdens største ø.

Det er et forsvar, der kun er blevet dyrere, i takt med at klimaforandringer har lettet sejlads omkring Grønland, at de sjældne metaller i Grønlands undergrund har fået strategisk betydning, og at både Kina og Rusland har udtalte ambitioner om at udfordre den vestlige verden; også i det arktiske område. USA kan sagtens argumentere for, at det har opnået en slags hævd over Grønland.

Hvor meget koster forsvaret af Grønland? Det er ikke gjort op, men i de seneste år danske forsvarspolitik indgår, at det som et absolut minimum vil koste os 50 mia. kroner om året bare at forsvare Danmark. At forsvare kæmpestore Grønland er næppe billigere. De godt 4 mia. kroner, vi giver Grønland i bloktilskud om året, er småpenge i sammenligning.

Så langt kan man forstå, at Trump blev fornærmet i 2019, da Mette Frederiksens afviste hans forslag om at købe Grønland som ”absurd”. I hans optik har det været generøst overhovedet at antyde, at man faktisk ville betale Danmark penge for at afstå Grønland.

Men Mette Frederiksen havde ret. Trump så Grønland som et stykke fast ejendom, men beboerne er et selvstændigt folk, som har rettigheder i den internationale retsorden. Dette har Danmark højtideligt anerkendt i et brev til FN’s generalforsamling i forbindelse med overgangen fra hjemmestyre til selvstyre i 2009.

Grønlænderne kan altså selv bestemme, hvor de vil høre til. Men i modsætning til situationen efter anden verdenskrig, hvor Danmark skulle lægge meget mere på bordet for at beholde Grønland, er det i dag svært at se, hvem der skulle matche den indsats, Danmark allerede har lagt ind.

Når grønlændere er vrede på Danmark og søger uafhængighed, er det på grund og følelser og historie. Ser man på, hvad det juridisk og økonomisk giver dem at have selvstyre inden for rigsfællesskabets rammer, er de overordentligt godt stillede.

Selvstyret giver Grønland mulighed for selv at have kontrol over alle offentlige funktioner, undtagen udenrigs- og sikkerhedspolitik, pengevæsen og tildeling af statsborgerskaber. Grønland har meget mere autonomi over for København end en amerikansk delstat har over for Washington. Det betyder, at skulle Grønland blive en ny delstat i USA, ville grønlænderne opleve et brat fald i deres selvbestemmelse.

Alternativt kunne Grønland blive et område med formel selvstændighed, men tilknyttet USA. Den slags ordninger har USA i forvejen en snes stykker af, for eksempel med de tidligere danske besiddelser på de vestindiske øer. USA har naturligvis også råd til at matche det danske bloktilskud, og langt mere til, hvis det var det, det handlede om.

Hvorfor skulle USA samle denne regning op, når Danmark har forpligtet sig til at betale den ud i al fremtid?

Men hvorfor skulle USA samle denne regning op, når Danmark har forpligtet sig til at betale den ud i al fremtid, eller i det mindste indtil Grønland måtte erklære sin fulde selvstændighed? Der er ingen begrundelse for det. Heller ikke de sjældne metaller. Dem skal man, uanset hvordan man vender og drejer det, betale grønlænderne for.

I 2019 fremhævede Donald Trump, at hans baggrund var i ejendomsbranchen, og at et køb af Grønland dybest set blot ville være ”a large real estate deal.” Det ville det ikke, men anskuer man alligevel Grønland som fast ejendom, ville de eftertragtede metaller skulle tælles som løsere. Hvad der er tilbage er et aktiv med et stort, negativt driftsresultat. Sådan et aktiv har ingen økonomisk værdi.

Hvis Grønland finder ud af at sælge sit løsøre – metallerne – og indtægterne bliver modregnet i bloktilskuddet, er det en ny situation. Men selv da er det svært at se begrundelsen for, at Grønland skulle afgive selvbestemmelse til USA – og endnu sværere at se, hvorfor nogen skulle sende penge til Danmark i den anledning.

Billederne er fra Sisimiut i Grønland.

Oversat til engelsk af ChatGPT 4o:

Why Greenland Isn’t Already American (and Likely Never Will Be)

In Denmark, a widespread belief is that the annual block grants to Greenland grant us, if not formal, then at least moral rights in the game of future claims over the world’s largest island. However, if viewed this way, Americans have even greater rights, as they handle territorial defense, which is extremely costly. So why isn’t Greenland already American? The answer lies in Trump’s comparison to a real estate deal. The Americans could never justify a return on such a transaction. Here is the story of Denmark’s and the USA’s dance of rights and responsibilities regarding Greenland.

In the summer of 1941, the good citizens of Nuuk saw a car for the first time. It was a jeep belonging to the American military. The renowned Greenlandic historian Jørgen Fleischer wrote about this in his 1996 book The Years of Transformation – Greenland from Colony to Province:

“When the vehicle rolled off the landing craft and onto the beach, reactions were diverse. The elderly looked mistrustfully at the contraption, shaking their heads. Small children ran away crying and terrified from the harbor area, and even the otherwise cheeky boys were paralyzed and didn’t dare approach the monster.”

The Greenlanders had several such experiences while Denmark was occupied, and supplies instead came from America. For example, they saw a kerosene lamp for the first time, and it was a revelation. Suddenly, they could actually see things during the darkest winter months. The oil lamps they had used until then provided only a very dim light.

Denmark itself had long since moved away from oil lamps. But it was Danish policy that Greenlanders should not be burdened with more modern civilization than absolutely necessary.
This policy can be described, depending on one’s temperament, as either condescending or respectful toward a vulnerable, indigenous culture. In any case, the Americans had no such scruples.

They quickly constructed eight small and large runways along Greenland’s west coast as stepping stones for military air traffic between America and Europe. And while they were in the neighborhood, they also took over the supply of Greenlandic towns and settlements. This was part of the agreement they made with Denmark’s ambassador in Washington, Henrik Kauffmann.

As Jørgen Fleischer writes: The war meant that Greenlanders woke up from a centuries-long slumber. They realized that the wider world was much more than just the Danes they knew. And when the war ended, they didn’t want the old system back. They wanted to partake in the benefits of the modern world.

To some extent, they already did.

Erik the Red, along with 500 comrades, had settled in southern Greenland in 985. His descendants eventually lost contact with their homeland— Iceland and, by extension, the Danish kingdom.
As a result, Copenhagen didn’t know when the Norse settlers in Greenland died out under circumstances that remain unclear.

Three hundred years ago, the Norwegian priest Hans Egede made it his life’s mission to find the Norse settlers. With the king’s blessing and funding from Bergen merchants, he assembled a small expedition fleet of three ships, which set sail in 1721. They, of course, didn’t find the Norse but discovered Inuit, whom Hans Egede sought to Christianize while continuing to search for the Norse. Egede established a colony he called Godthåb—today Nuuk.
Later, about twenty other colonies were established along the coast, some near existing Inuit communities, others on barren rocks.

The core of these colonies was whaling and trade. The Danes needed places to service whalers and process the whales they brought in. While there, they also traded with local Inuit. The Inuit sold items like skins and could receive coffee, sugar, and tools in return.

The simple goods from the Royal Greenland Trading Company marked significant material progress and left lasting traces in Greenlandic culture. Celebratory events involve kaffemik, and on solemn occasions, women wear national costumes originally designed with beads obtained through trade.

But it is an anachronism when even leading Danish politicians today describe Greenland as a former Danish colony. In its time, the term “colony” meant something very different from when European countries took control of countries in Asia, Africa, or the Americas. In the Greenlandic context, “colony” merely referred to small settlements.

Neither did the local Inuit see the colonies as an expression of conquest over their territory. To their worldview, they were born into a vast, sparsely populated land. They moved according to hunting opportunities, and the concept of borders between “your land” and “our land” hadn’t occurred to them. Nor did they see themselves as part of a Greenlandic people.

Thus, they did not mind that some white people came and settled on small patches of land. On the contrary, as long as it gave them opportunities to trade their catch for goods from a foreign world.

The Danes who arrived were, of course, familiar with the concepts of borders and nations. Yet, even when World War II broke out, it was still new to them to view Greenland as a unified entity. Denmark’s administration of the country was divided into a northern and a southern part, and in the 1930s, Norway had claimed sovereignty over parts of East Greenland.

All this was shaken up by the world war and the temporarily severed connections between Denmark and Greenland. Immediately after the war, Greenlanders might still not have seen themselves as one people. But they at least had some common conditions and interests to unite around: they desired progress compared to what they had experienced under Denmark’s administration of Greenland.

From Denmark’s perspective, the situation was more complicated:

Denmark could not ignore the fact that Greenlanders saw the American presence as a significant advantage. No number of rulings in Denmark’s favor by the International Court of Justice in The Hague could change the reality that if Greenland were to remain Danish in any meaningful way, Denmark had to offer Greenlanders terms that matched the benefits provided by the American presence.

This was quickly decided. With the constitutional amendment in 1953, Greenland became a county of Denmark, with all that entailed — including that Greenlanders were to have the same access to public goods as all other Danish citizens.

This was an expensive decision for Denmark, and the choice reflects the extreme difficulty any state has in relinquishing territory. The rational choice at the time would have been to transfer Greenland to the Americans. Emotional ties at the individual level between Greenland and Denmark only emerged later. At that time, few Danes had been to Greenland, and vice versa.

The reality was also that Greenland was militarily under American sovereignty. Kaufmann had signed an agreement granting the U.S. extensive military rights on the island in perpetuity. This caused significant controversy at the time, but nothing could change the fact that in global conflicts, having control over all of Greenland had proven to be of great importance. The era when it was sufficient to patrol the waters for competing whalers was long over.

It soon became clear that the end of World War II did not mean Greenland became less significant. On the contrary, the Americans needed what would become Thule Air Base as a forward post against the Soviet Union. From the mid-1950s, Danish governments also practically allowed the Americans to store nuclear weapons at the base, though this was kept secret.

In the mid-1990s, when the harsh conditions of the Cold War had receded enough to allow hindsight without sounding foolish, media attention focused on this duplicity by official Denmark. Weekendavisen reported on what the Americans had brought to the negotiating table: They were willing to be friendly toward Denmark, but the base would be established regardless, and if Denmark objected, the Americans could infer two things from their history: first, that they were not big fans of European monarchies, and second, the Monroe Doctrine, which referred to the American continent (including Greenland) as the U.S.’s sphere of interest.

Neither of these historical arguments was strong. Post-World War II Denmark was merely a constitutional monarchy, and Denmark had not committed any actions described by the Monroe Doctrine as unfriendly to the U.S. — such as occupying land with an existing state authority. Naturally, the Americans could have no objections to establishing states and governments where none previously existed, as that was how the U.S. itself expanded from the original 13 colonies on the East Coast.

Thus, no one wanted to be too explicit about Greenland’s actual place in the international community. The country became part of Denmark, which handled all practical and administrative matters. But it was simultaneously clear that the U.S. practically had the right and duty to handle the expensive defense of the world’s largest island.

This defense has only grown more costly as climate change has eased navigation around Greenland, the rare minerals in Greenland’s subsoil have gained strategic importance, and both China and Russia have expressed ambitions to challenge the Western world, including in the Arctic region. The U.S. can easily argue that it has gained a form of prescriptive rights over Greenland.

How much does defending Greenland cost? This has not been calculated, but in recent years, Danish defense policy includes a minimum cost of DKK 50 billion annually just to defend Denmark. Defending massive Greenland is unlikely to be cheaper. The approximately DKK 4 billion in annual block grants to Greenland are mere pocket change in comparison.

This context makes it understandable that Trump was offended in 2019 when Mette Frederiksen dismissed his proposal to buy Greenland as “absurd.” From his perspective, it was generous to even suggest paying Denmark for relinquishing Greenland.

But Mette Frederiksen was right. Trump viewed Greenland as a piece of real estate, but its inhabitants are an independent people with rights under international law. Denmark has solemnly acknowledged this in a letter to the UN General Assembly in connection with the transition from home rule to self-government in 2009.

Greenlanders can therefore decide for themselves which nation they belong to. But unlike after World War II, when Denmark had to offer much more to retain Greenland, it is now hard to see who could match the efforts Denmark has already made.
When Greenlanders are angry with Denmark and seek independence, it is due to feelings and history. Looking at the legal and economic benefits they gain from self-government within the framework of the Kingdom of Denmark, they are extraordinarily well-positioned.

Self-government allows Greenland to control all public functions except foreign and security policy, currency, and the granting of citizenship. Greenland has much greater autonomy from Copenhagen than an American state has from Washington. This means that if Greenland were to become a new U.S. state, Greenlanders would experience a sharp reduction in their self-determination.

Alternatively, Greenland could become a formally independent territory affiliated with the U.S. The U.S. already has about twenty such arrangements, for example, with the former Danish possessions in the West Indies. The U.S. can certainly afford to match Denmark’s block grant and much more if that were the issue.

But why would the U.S. take on this expense when Denmark has committed to it indefinitely, or at least until Greenland declares full independence? There is no justification for it. Not even the rare minerals. Regardless of how one views the situation, Greenlanders must be paid for them.

In 2019, Donald Trump highlighted his background in real estate, claiming that purchasing Greenland was “a large real estate deal.” It was not, but if one views Greenland as real estate, the sought-after minerals would count as fixtures. What remains is an asset with a large, negative operating result. Such an asset has no economic value.

If Greenland manages to sell its minerals and the revenue offsets the block grant, that would be a new situation. But even then, it is hard to see why Greenland would surrender self-determination to the U.S. — and even harder to see why anyone would pay Denmark in that context.

The images are from Sisimiut, Greenland.